The Piikuni and the U.S. Army’s Piegan Expedition

Competing Narratives of the 1870 Massacre on the Marias River

by Rodger C. Henderson

Above, Montana Piegan camp, no date. In the winter of 1869–1870, the U.S. Second Cavalry under the command of Major Eugene Baker attacked the camp of “friendly” Piikuni chief Heavy Runner and killed over two hundred people, most of whom were women, children, and elders. In the aftermath, contradictory narratives emerged: the military branded the attack as a heroic battle, while survivors’ accounts revealed it as a massacre. Glenbow Museum and Archives, Alberta, Canada NA-1463-4
On a bitterly cold day in January 1870, a band of over three hundred Piikuni people camped near the Big Bend of the Marias River. The steep bluffs offered protection from the bitter winds of north-central Montana Territory, while the riparian area provided firewood and water during winter’s harshest month. Theirs was not the only Blackfeet band sheltering in the river bottoms, yet this camp stood apart in self-imposed smallpox quarantine. Near the center stood Chief Heavy Runner’s painted lodges housing his wives and their children. All around, the lodges of relatives were quiet in the predawn hours. Most of the able-bodied men had departed camp to hunt, leaving young boys to guard several hundred horses while the elderly and those women yet uninfected by illness tended the sick and watched over sleeping children.

When dawn came, the whole world shattered.
The U.S. Second Cavalry under the command of Major Eugene Baker decimated Heavy Runner’s camp without warning on January 23, 1870, in what the military called the Piegan Expedition. Cavalrymen shot Heavy Runner and slaughtered 217 noncombatant elders, women, and children. They then destroyed the food supply, burned lodges, and captured four to five hundred of the camp’s horses. Few of Heavy Runner’s people survived. No depredations had been committed by the band, and Heavy Runner carried papers identifying him as being on peaceful terms with the United States. As trader Alexander Culbertson observed, 1870 would forever be engraved as “the year of Smallpox and Soldiers.” Since that time, survivors’ experiences have been preserved through the oral tradition and retold by one generation to the next, painted on war robes, and documented in public testimony and press interviews.

The Piikuni history of the event is based on the accounts of survivors Spear Woman, Bear Head, Good Bear Woman, Buffalo Trail Woman, Mary Middle Calf, and others. Individually and collectively, survivors’ accounts provide ample evidence that the Piegan Expedition was a deliberate massacre on a par with the most violent of those committed against tribal nations, including Shoshones at Bear River, Washington Territory (1863); Cheyennes at Sand Creek, Colorado (1864); Arapahoes and Cheyennes at the Washita River, Indian Territory (1868); Apaches at Camp Grant, Arizona (1871); Modocs in Oregon Territory (1873); and the Lakotas at Wounded Knee, Dakota Territory (1890). Yet the Baker Massacre, as it is often called, is one of the least known and studied military operations of the Indian Wars.

The military’s account and its justification for striking a “friendly” camp coalesced around its claim regarding the necessity of a winter campaign against “hostile Piegons.” Importantly, Major Baker reported killing mostly warriors and only a small number of women and children in what he claimed was a battle. His official reports, modified by senior officers and accepted as factual by the War Depart-
ment, are contradicted by Piikuni testimony and that of some military participants. In turn, historians and biographers have based their works on military reports, largely ignoring the Piikuni accounts and scarcely scrutinizing statements made by General of the Army William T. Sherman, Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan, Major General Winfield S. Hancock, Colonel Philippe Régis de Trobriand, and Major Eugene Baker.

With regard to Baker’s Piegan Expedition, Montana settlers and the military claimed that Indians’ state of “barbarism” justified the massacre as a means of subjugation, while the goal of advancing “civilization” exonerated the United States of the wholesale slaughter of non-combatants. Expansionism and imperialism have often been justified by the ideology of Manifest Destiny in order to obscure the ruthlessness of the United States’ dispossession of indigenous inhabitants. Histories in the West often reveal cultural and ideological values that undermine and, in many cases, deny the validity of Native peoples’ experiences as they, too, experienced westward expansion.

This article reexamines the Baker Massacre and explains how two glaringly different accounts emerged in the aftermath of the bloodshed—and why it is important that a more accurate and complete history is remembered.

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Beginning with the fur trade and spurred by the discovery of gold in the late 1850s, colonization proceeded rapidly in what would become Montana Territory. In northern Montana, whites trespassing into the homelands of the southern Blackfeet sought a quick end to Indian land title during the 1860s, prompting a rapid federal military buildup. Encouraged by the settlers, territorial governor Sidney Edgerton appealed to the legislature to “take steps for the extinguishment of the Indian title in this territory, in order that our lands may be brought into the market.”

In 1870, the Department of the Interior controlled the Office of Indian Affairs, to the dissatisfaction of General Sherman, who sought its return to the War Department so that the army would have complete control over Indian affairs on and off the reservations and the ability to respond to settler-Indian conflicts without oversight. Despite President Ulysses Grant’s Peace Policy of 1869, the practice of total submission supported by Sherman and Sheridan, commander of the Military Division of the Missouri, dictated much of the country’s actual interactions with Indians. When off the reservation, Indians were “under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of military authority,” Sheridan claimed. Tribes who complied were considered “friendly,” while those who resisted confinement or persisted in their traditional ways were “hostile” and thus justifiable targets. Both Sherman
and Sheridan sought an end to the government’s policy of making treaties, preferring the use of the military to force unconditional surrender.6

The War Department had little interest in policing the everyday interactions between Natives and whites in Montana Territory; rather, the region was heavily garrisoned in order to prevent any attempted defense of indigenous lands, such as Red Cloud’s successful closure of the Bozeman Trail in 1867. In 1869, the newly recruited troops filling Fort Shaw and Fort Ellis were ready for offensive action. That summer, Sheridan ordered that “all Indians . . . who do not immediately remove to their reservations, will be . . . treated as hostile, wherever they may be found.”7

Rapid military expansion had generated unease

An advocate of Indian extermination, General Philip Sheridan (right) masterminded the 1870 Piegan Expedition, mirroring the strategy he used in an 1868 attack against a “friendly” Cheyenne camp. After the press branded Major Eugene Baker’s attack a massacre of innocents, Sheridan doctored the official report in an effort to justify the slaughter of noncombatants as if they were “hostiles.”

An unidentified army officer drew this image of Fort Benton in 1869. A trading and freighting town, Fort Benton was located in the heart of Piikuni territory. In the summer of 1869, settlers accused Piegans of attacking freight wagons leaving Fort Benton and of raiding their livestock, using such incidents to demand increased military presence and protection.
within tribes, particularly among “hostile” nations such as the Piegans, and violent episodes in 1868 and 1869 increased tensions. During 1868 treaty negotiations, Mountain Chief requested that the treaty commissioner remove some of the white men from the Piikunis’ country because of bad behavior; on July 3, whites shot at him. In May 1869, settlers on the Musselshell River fought Piikunis camped there, killing and decapitating ten. The press used this event as an opportunity to appeal for more troops in the territory “to protect its citizens from a savage foe.”

In a lengthy conflict in early August, “the teamsters with the train in the fight . . . on Eagle Creek killed four and wounded two Indians, losing one man killed and twenty oxen.” When trader Alexander Culbertson, whose wife was a member of the Blood tribe, sent three Piikuni men to Fort Benton on an errand in late August 1869, white men set upon them. The whites hanged Heavy Charging in the Brush, shot and killed Bear Child, and also killed Rock Old Man. Montana Superintendent of Indian Affairs Alfred Sully thought he could arrest the murderers but knew he would not be able to secure a conviction in a territorial court.

Over the next few months, more hostilities between whites and small groups of Indians alleged to be “Bloods, Blackfeet, and Piegans” disrupted trade and travel. Sully requested Commissioner of Indian Affairs Ely Parker arrange for additional troops to protect citizens, inhibit whiskey traders, and prevent whites from indiscriminately killing Indians. Although Sully believed white “ruffians” were largely responsible for conflicts, Parker alleged the Indians regarded the United States’ nonfulfillment of treaty stipulations as “just cause for a general war” involving all the tribes in the Blackfoot confederacy.

Complicating the situation was the murder of rancher Malcolm Clarke on August 17, 1869, by a young Piegan man named Peter Owl Child and his compatriots, who also seriously wounded Clarke’s son Horace. Sully dismissed Clarke’s death as a sad event, and even Philippe Régis de Trobriand, commander at Fort Shaw and of the Military District of Montana,
regarded it as the climax of a long-standing family dispute (Clarke was married to Owl Child’s cousin), but both were aware that Clarke’s death could lead to further violence. Notably, Sully urged Parker that “all should be done to prevent a general war.” On September 27, however, Sully reported that “over four hundred horses and mules had been stolen” from whites during August and September, allegedly by Blackfeet. Worse yet, someone—Pie-gans, Sully presumed—had attacked and killed a man named James Quail, whose “body was found pierced with arrows and horribly mutilated.” Settlers demanded an investigation and organized a campaign to pressure the military into action.

In early October 1869, a grand jury convened in Helena to investigate Clarke’s murder and allegations that Indians had committed livestock depredations. U.S. Marshal William F. Wheeler presented the names of fifty-six white settlers, gathered from newspapers, who had allegedly been killed by Indians. He reported that Indians had stolen over one thousand horses that year. Wheeler also sought indictments against five Piikunis allegedly identified by Horace Clarke and Helen Clarke, Malcolm’s daughter, as his killers. General Philippe Régis de Trobriand, acting on behalf of the military, testified that although the Helena Citizens Committee had been asked to supply information regarding Indian disturbances, members sent no information. Thus, he asserted, no disturbances had occurred. In fact, de Trobriand stated, “there is actually no Indian war in the Territory.”

Nonetheless, litigants presented themselves as engaged in a great “contest between civilization and barbarism” and presented misleading evidence, claiming settlers suffered great losses by “predatory bands of Indians.” They pressed de Trobriand to ensure military action was taken against the Blackfeet tribes. Alleging that these Indians had “moved their women and children” over the border into British territory in order to obtain “supplies of ammunition and improved arms,” the grand jury concluded, “This is a declaration of war on the whites of Montana.” Warrants for the arrest of the five Piegans accused of killing Malcolm Clarke resulted from the grand jury’s indictments.
General Philip Sheridan used the call for more troops as the impetus to launch an offensive winter attack on the Piegans. Sheridan and Sherman had already applied the same strategy against the Kiowas on the Red River in 1867 and in attacks on the Cheyennes and Comanches in 1868. Sheridan knew that early morning winter attacks, when the Indians were “helpless to move their stock and villages,” made it harder for them to escape and increased the odds of success.

Near the end of October, Sheridan proposed to Sherman, “Let me find out exactly where these Indians are going to spend the Winter; and about the time of a good heavy Snow I will send out a party and try and strike them” when “they will be very helpless.” Sheridan knew that only “women and children and the decrepit old men were with the villages.” “We must occasionally strike where it hurts,” he added. The purpose of the winter attack was “to strike the Indians a hard blow and force them onto the reservations; . . . to show to the Indian that . . . he, with his villages and stock, could be destroyed.” General Sherman sent word on November 4, 1869, that the “proposed action . . . for the punishment of these marauders has been approved.”

On November 15, 1869, Sheridan recommended Major Eugene Baker of the U.S. Second Cavalry be assigned to lead the expedition. “Major Baker . . . is a most excellent man to be entrusted with any party you may see fit to send out,” Sheridan assured Major General Winfield Hancock, commander of the Department of Dakota, adding, “I spoke to him on the
subject when he passed through Chicago.” En route, Baker conferred with de Trobriand at Fort Shaw on December 22 and continued to Bozeman to take charge of Fort Ellis. Inspector General of the Military Division of the Missouri James Hardie thought Baker “should be allowed to proceed generally according to the circumstances under which he finds himself in his operations,” an opinion to which Sheridan replied, “Tell Baker to strike them hard.” Hardie agreed, writing, “I think chastisement necessary. In this Colonel Baker concurs. He [knows] the General’s wishes . . . [and] may be relied on to do all . . . in the way of vigorous and sufficient action.” Thus, Sheridan expanded Sherman’s authorization to include attacking a camp sheltering any Piikunis and empowered Hancock to extend the order and authorization to de Trobriand and Baker.¹⁹

Sully and de Trobriand discussed attacking a friendly Piegan camp in order to quiet the others, after which de Trobriand lamented, “I cannot honestly say that I regret that no action has been taken on your proposition to pitch into those two friendly little bands.” In early January, de Trobriand ordered Baker “to chastise that portion of the Indian tribe of Piegan under Mountain Chief or his sons.” De Trobriand’s intent was to surprise Mountain Chief’s camp first and then sweep into bands camped near Riplinger’s trading post and then others farther away. However, he specified that the camps of Heavy Runner and Big Lake—chiefs of the two “friendly” bands—“should be left unmolested.”²⁰

On January 6, 1870, Major Baker and four cavalry companies left Fort Ellis for Fort Shaw. From there, 217 soldiers and officers, augmented by 55 mounted infantrymen and a company of regular U.S. Thirteenth Infantry (83 soldiers), marched by night northward to the Marias River. Twenty-year-old Joe Kipp—the son of trader James Kipp, who had built the first trading post for the Piegan in 1831, and Earth Woman, the daughter of a Mandan chief—was a guide and interpreter whose job it was to provide Baker with “all necessary information” about the different Blackfeet camps. Baker, who had arrived in Montana just a month earlier, had little knowledge of the different Piegan bands, yet more than once, he dismissed Kipp’s efforts to identify each camp.²¹

Heavy Runner’s camp on the Marias River was simply “the handiest and easiest target.”²² Although Baker later described the expedition as “a scout made by me against the hostile Piegans and Blood Indians,” it was much more.²³ “We killed one hundred and seventy-three Indians, captured over one hundred women and children, and over three hundred horses,” Baker declared in his initial report on February 18. The women and children prisoners “were allowed to go free, as it was ascertained that some of them had the small-pox.”²⁴ The expedition then destroyed “forty-four lodges with all their supplies and stores” and “a large amount of peltries, etc.”²⁵ The cavalry claimed that the smallpox outbreak necessitated that the troops burn all the Piegan’s possessions.²⁶ Destruction of supplies would also have made it more difficult for those who had escaped the killing to survive the winter weather.

Many survivors feared reprisals if they spoke openly of the massacre and remained silent, but in

Guide, scout, and interpreter Joseph Kipp (on left, seated) was the son of trader James Kipp and a Mandan woman, Earth Woman (Mary Garneau). At twenty years old, Kipp was hired to guide Baker’s expedition to a Piegan camp.
time, others recounted their traumatic experiences in detail. Good Bear Woman, Mary Middle Calf, and Buffalo Trail Woman were young women at the time, and they recalled that the surprise attack happened at dawn, early morning, or near sunrise while many of the people were still asleep. The soldiers came over the hill, one group moving to the right and another to the left, and quickly surrounded the camp. It was very cold, and the camp was quiet when the troops arrived. Two hunting parties of men had left the camp during the previous two days. About ten young men, including Bear Head, were tending the horse herd.

Witnesses described a soldier shouting an order and then others started shooting into the camp. Chief Heavy Runner, alerted to the soldiers’ presence by barking dogs and people in the camp shouting for him to meet the soldiers, left his lodge carrying a paper above his head, yelling to the soldiers to cease shooting as he was Heavy Runner, a friend of the whites. Good Bear Woman remembered Heavy Runner handing Baker some papers that Baker tore up and discarded. People rushed from their tipis to see what was happening. Spear Woman, Good Bear Woman, Buffalo Trail Woman, Mary Middle Calf, Bear Head, Takes Gun at Night, and Last Gun watched in shock as bullets riddled Heavy Runner’s body, and then they quickly reentered their respective lodges. Soldiers on ridges above the camp continued firing round after

As the painted lodges in this undated photograph show, some Piikuni camps could be identified by the designs on the lodges of prominent individuals. Joe Kipp’s familiarity with the Piikuni bands made it possible for him to identify Heavy Runner’s lodges correctly, but Baker—who knew Sheridan’s intentions—ignored Kipp’s warning and attacked the friendly chief’s camp.
This recent photograph shows the likely site of the Baker Massacre. Heavy Runner’s camp was surrounded on three sides by the Big Bend of the Marias River and blocked by steep banks. Survivors—some of whom had smallpox, many of whom were children—fled across the icy river and up nearby ravines in search of another camp and possible safety.
round into the camp. One of the women heard a bugle; another said she heard four or more volleys fired directly into people’s lodges. She testified that the shooting came from all directions because the soldiers had encircled the camp and that there was little return fire. The witnesses also described how several of Heavy Runner’s family members, including his wife Whole Woman, were killed.

After firing from the bluffs for some time, the soldiers charged into the midst of the lodges. Mary Middle Calf’s mother, Catches Inside, was wounded in the hand. Some of the people in her lodge were killed. Buffalo Trail Woman’s wounded husband, Good Stab (Yellow Owl), was shot and killed, and she was wounded on her back and her left ear, a scar she carried for life. Soldiers killed an old man and others hiding under bison skins in their lodge. Wolf Leader was shot through the jaw; Spopee (Turtle) through both hips. Three other wounded men—Black Eagle, Almost A Dog, and Fog Eater—also survived. Black Antelope, an old man, wished their hunters had been there to defend the camp from soldiers. Numerous witnesses stated that the Piikunis returned little of the soldiers’ fire.

All of the survivors noticed that most of the people killed were women, elderly men, children, and even newborn babies. Some witnesses reported at least 150 to 170 Piikuni people were killed, and others estimated the death toll closer to 300. Some survivors thought the massacre was revenge for Peter Owl Child having killed Malcolm Clarke. During the slaughter, one witness recalled, Three Bears cried out, saying, the soldiers “killed us off without reason for it.”

Even those who remained in their lodges were not spared. Spear Woman witnessed one soldier cutting a lodge covering and shooting everyone who moved. Bear Head’s mother, Fair Singing Woman, and his
aunties and his sisters were slaughtered as the soldiers swept through the village. Buffalo Trail Woman saw a group of soldiers encircle a lodge and fire upon it in unison. Soldiers then took all the blankets and robes they wanted from the lodges, tore down the tipis in the camp, and set everything on fire—including some of the wounded people. Baker’s troops burned bedding, clothing, sacred medicine bundles, food stores, and lodges and then captured all of the camp’s horses to prevent survivors from escaping.

A few women and children did escape, including Red Paint Woman, who was shot in the leg, and eight-year-old Long Time Calf, who grabbed her infant niece and carried her across the icy river. Another woman, her daughter, and a few friends hid and were later able to escape on foot. Many more, captured by the soldiers as prisoners of war, were held until nightfall in the two lodges Baker’s troops had not destroyed. Survivors and soldiers both described how some of these prisoners were killed with axes the night after the attack.

In the immediate aftermath of the massacre, settlers applauded the Piegan Expedition. One member boasted, “Wherever we passed on our return we were greeted with cheers, and invited to partake freely of the hospitality of the people.” Four months after the attack, a newly arrived immigrant observed that “the Indians have been remarkably quiet. . . . Baker’s raid on the Piegons seems to have shed terror amongst them.”

In June 1870, Mountain Chief, who denied he had done anything to indicate that his tribal nation had declared war on the United States, “hoped that the future had something better in store for him and his now bowed down people.” The military attack “spread terror among them.” Throughout the 1870s, Piikunis “react[ed] with the most pathetic fright to the mere appearance of a soldier, many of them running in panic for the brush.” On January 1, 1880, Marshal Wheeler declared in the Helena Weekly Herald that “it has been safe to travel all over their country” and took pride in announcing that the white conquest of the Piegons was nearly complete.

The Piegan Expedition may have been a continuation of efforts targeting Mountain Chief, but its deeper purpose was to subjugate the Piegans. The attack destroyed their resistance and facilitated their dispossession. And it was effective. On April 25, 1870, Montana congressman James H. Cavanaugh introduced a bill to extinguish Indian land title and to open up additional areas to white settlement. At the time, the Blackfeet Reservation stretched across the northern tier of Montana Territory from the Rocky Mountains almost to the confluence of the Yellowstone and Missouri Rivers. In 1872 and 1873, President Grant issued two executive orders altering the size of the Blackfeet Reservation and transferring portions to the public domain. In 1887, an act of Congress reduced the remaining reserved Piikuni lands by an additional 17 million acres.

The Baker Massacre expedited the transfer of tribal lands into the public domain by effectively quelling any potential resistance. Subsequent executive orders and acts of Congress stripped the Blackfeet of most of their territory, reducing the reservation by millions of acres between 1870 and 1887. This photograph shows the reservation home of massacre survivor Cut Bank John (Takes Gun at Night), one of Heavy Runner’s sons raised by Joe Kipp.
To the military, the Piegan Expedition represented the triumph of military solutions to the “Indian question.” “Too much credit cannot be given to the officers and men of the command for their conduct during the whole expedition,” Baker added to his February 18 report. But there were significant problems with Baker’s report. On January 30, 1870—three weeks before Baker made his initial report—Blackfeet agent William B. Pease reported the massacre to Sully. Pease had visited Fort Shaw during the last week of January to interview the expedition’s officers as well as de Trobriand. He concluded that only twenty or thirty of those killed were men, “the rest women and children.” Upon receiving Pease’s report, Sully confronted de Trobriand, asking, “How many of these killed were men?” Sully ordered Pease to Big Lake’s camp to interview survivors. Between the second of February and the fifth, Pease “talked with several Indians who were in the camp which was attacked by the soldiers.” His final report tallied the number killed at eighteen old men, fifteen young men aged twelve to thirty-seven, ninety women, and fifty children, “many of them in their mothers’ arms.” He accounted for only fifty-one Blackfeet survivors: eighteen women, nineteen small children and infants, some of the wounded who were “spared by the soldiers,” nine young men who had escaped, and five hunters who had been away from the camp.

Despite Pease’s thoroughness, he could not account for all survivors. Some had fled to nearby camps, others survived by hiding, and those who had been held as prisoners were left behind by the troops. Among them were Bear Head (age fourteen), Wolf Leader (adult male), Comes With Rattles (six), Last Gun (fourteen), Black Eagle (adult male), Almost A Dog (adult male), Takes Gun At Night (ten), Double Strike Woman (ten), Wolf Eagle (a hunter), Spear Woman (six), Fog Eater (adult male), Turtle (adult male), Curlew Woman (forty-one), Three Bears (old man), and Black Antelope (old man). In reply to Pease’s detailed report, Sully noted, “Mountain Chief’s band was not the band that suffered.”

When the public compared Baker’s belated combat report that stated his command killed mainly men with Pease’s report that only fifteen were men of warrior age, an outcry against Baker and Sheridan ensued. Secretary of the Board of Indian Commissioners Vincent Colyer sent Chairman Felix Brunot a summary of the destruction of Heavy Runner’s village based on Pease’s report, which the New York Times published. The letter was read in Congress, and news of the atrocity spread across the nation.

In retaliation, de Trobriand tried to silence Pease. On March 27, 1870, he accused Pease of slandering the army and filing a false report. Pease had exposed the fact that Baker’s expedition had disregarded General Order No. 100 against slaughtering noncombatants. In response, Pease demanded a full investigation, in part to clear his name but also to discover why the military’s reports differed so greatly from the Indians’. In his faulty February 18 report, Major Baker entangled himself and the military command in writing and rewriting the story of the massacre by omitting crucial details and including deceptive ones.
De Trobriand stated in his first report, dated January 26, that Baker’s command’s attacked Bear Chief’s camp. On February 2, he again reported that Baker had attacked Bear Chief, whom de Trobriand identified as one of Mountain Chief’s sons and an alleged party to Malcolm Clarke’s killing. He failed to mention that Bear Chief was Heavy Runner’s less commonly used name, thus obscuring the fact that the peaceful chief’s band had been targeted. Sheridan added another layer of deception to Baker’s report when he altered it to say that Baker had attacked the “camps of Bear Chief and Big Horn.” Guides Joe Kipp and Horace Clarke knew that the village was actually Heavy Runner’s and that many of the slain were women and children. Kipp later reported that soldiers read the “papers taken from the dead body of Chief Heavy Runner” and then buried him in an unmarked grave.

Upon receiving Baker’s February 18 report, General Sherman noted there were omissions and ordered Sheridan to have Baker fix it. “I think Colonel Baker should have reported more exactly the number, sex, and kind of Indians killed” in order “to meet the public charge that of the number killed the greatest part were squaws and children.” Baker, after consulting with his officers, replied to Sheridan that “the following numbers [are] approximate . . . nearly to the exact truth . . . as any estimate . . . can possibly be made.” Baker stated that the troops killed 120 warriors, “able men,” and 53 women and children.
“accidentally” and had taken 140 prisoners (women and children) who were afterward released. Baker did not actually specify, as ordered, the age, sex, number, or condition of the killed. Baker’s data did not match the evidence gathered by Agent Pease, but his reports of February 18 and March 25 became the official military record of the massacre.52

As accounts of the killing of noncombatants emerged, the army revised its narrative. Hancock argued that few women and children were killed and stated that Reverend John B. Imoda, a clergyman among the Piikunis, supported his contention. Similarly, de Trobriand referenced a Father Devereaux in his rebuttal to Agent Pease’s findings. While several priests did work among the Blackfeet people at the time, no record of “Father Devereaux” has been discovered nor does it appear that Reverend Imoda was present at the massacre. Furthermore, de Trobriand claimed the attack was a “surprise,” but in the next statement asserted, “Quarter was given to all known in time—as women and children.” He also said that about one hundred women and children were “captured in action” but released unhurt. Then, in an attempt to shift the blame, de Trobriand said that many women died because their husbands murdered them “in order to save them . . . from tortures among the white men which are inflicted upon white women when captured by those Red fiends.”53

Sheridan, repeating word for word most of his 1868 report on the Washita Massacre, said the Indian women and children fought as fiercely and desperately as the men, so the noncombatant designation hardly applied. He also claimed that the women and children were killed accidentally. Coming to the aid of his superior officer, Hancock reiterated that Baker “was directed to attack” the camp, and if warriors were not present and some women and children killed, it was because it was necessary for the troops to “fire into the lodges at the outset to drive the Indians out to an open contest.” Other women were killed because they fought “with and as well as the men.” He claimed fewer than forty women and children were killed. In February 1870, de Trobriand attempted to justify the killing of Heavy Runner, arguing “Heavy Runner was killed, by his own fault” because, de Trobriand reasoned, he had left the safety of the trading post and gone to the “hostile” camp to get some whiskey. In this way, the military commanders invented a story of the massacre that evolved into the dominant narrative of the so-called “Piegan fight.”54

Investigating the incident in March, Inspector General of the Military Division of the Missouri James Hardie asked de Trobriand if Baker struck a band of Piegs, guilty of depredations and, if so, how de Trobriand and Baker could have been certain of their guilt. Furthermore, how did de Trobriand know Baker was aware of the number, age, sex, and condition of the people killed in the attack? Hardie then ordered de Trobriand to call in guides Horace Clarke and Joe Kipp, get their testimony, and mail their affidavits to his office. He also directed de Trobriand to “prepare a detailed statement of all the mischief done by the Piegs since you have been in Command of the District.” By piling up accusations, the military intended to prove that the Indians deserved the chastisement heaped upon them.55

De Trobriand answered Hardie’s queries with a sharply worded reply that makes Baker’s reports all the more suspect: “Baker never knew the state, age, sex or condition of the Indians killed. How could he?” Under pressure to explain how he and Baker knew the Indians killed were hostiles, de Trobriand simply raised the estimates to 220 killed and said 70 were warriors, not 120 able men as reported earlier by Baker. De Trobriand then insinuated that Baker killed 150 women, children, and old men—a number closer to Pease’s 158 noncombatants killed. Conceptualized and implemented as a surprise, the attack on the Piikuni winter camp, de Trobriand maintained, was a “complete success.”56

De Trobriand never interrogated Horace Clarke or Joe Kipp and was not disciplined for this disobedience. When author Frank B. Linderman much later asked Joe Kipp to describe the attack for a written narrative, Kipp refused: “Nope, Frank. By God, if I’d tell de truth dey’d hang me yit, sure’s hell, you know.” A soldier testified that de Trobriand had commanded Kipp to guide Baker to a winter camp, but when they approached a camp on the night of January 22, Baker ordered Kipp and the other guides to the rear and took over their work. On January 23, Kipp informed Baker the camp they had discovered was Heavy Runner’s, but Baker still ordered the attack, aware that the real intention was to strike a friendly camp. Had de Trobriand followed Hardie’s order to interview Kipp after the event, the guide could have
sworn that Baker knowingly attacked Heavy Runner’s peaceful camp. Furthermore, Kipp could have testified that the casualties were overwhelmingly old men, women, and children; there was little return fire; the soldiers killed and buried Heavy Runner; and that he had counted 217 dead Piegans.

For the same reasons, de Trobriand avoided interviewing Horace Clarke. In later testimony and in his reminiscences, Clarke argued that Baker’s command massacred Heavy Runner and his people “owing to too much excitement and confusion and misinformation.” He, like the other guides, had been under the impression that the target was supposed to be Mountain Chief or Owl Child, against whom the army had justifiable grudges. Horace testified in an affidavit that some survivors were wounded, others had smallpox, and their lodges and supplies had been destroyed and burned in subzero temperatures. He described how soldiers and civilian guides confiscated or burned thousands of bison robes, deliberately leaving women and children vulnerable to the elements. The soldiers also took the survivors’ horses. Horace further charged that “Col. Baker was drunk and did not know what he was doing.” Because de Trobriand understood that Kipp’s and Clarke’s memories would be damaging to the military’s public image, he refused to answer Hardie’s queries and kept their potentially incriminating evidence out of the official reports. In doing so, de Trobriand created a large gap in the record of the massacre and altered the official account.

In sum, as in the aftermath of the 1868 attack on Black Kettle’s Cheyenne village, competing historical narratives emerged about Baker’s attack. One depicted the event as a battle, the other as a massacre.

In the debate, General Sherman defended Sheridan and Baker while chastising Sully over newspaper accounts that criticized the military’s actions, saying, “There was such a hue and cry against General Sheridan and Colonel Baker that I had to come to their relief.” Conveniently, the Army and Navy Journal came to Sherman’s assistance, publishing three articles by soldier participants in March 1870 that helped transform a massacre into a fight.

Together, these men’s efforts shaped the military’s dominant narrative into the story of a
successful expedition against “hostile” Indians. Just weeks before the massacre, General Sherman had referred to Indians as “the enemies of our race and our civilization” and as “marauders.” Yet Mountain Chief, Heavy Runner, and the Piikuni tribe were not hostile toward the United States. As Helen Clarke, Malcolm Clarke’s daughter and witness to his murder, later wrote, Mountain Chief was called “hostile” because he said that whites “have encroached on our territory; they are killing our buffalo . . .; they have treated my nation like dogs . . .; there is nothing in common between us.”

Building on settlers’ fears of predatory Indians, Sherman altered the story of the massacre when he crossed out the words “on this occasion” and inserted in their place “at Mountain Chief’s camp” when writing to Sheridan on March 24, 1870: “I prefer to believe that the majority of the killed at Mountain Chief’s camp were warriors.” In this way, Sherman shifted the tone of the story from federal aggression to federal protection. On February 28 and March 18, Sheridan deliberately obfuscated the whole event with his hate-filled, anti-Indian tirades to Sherman, while Sherman changed the name of the band Baker attacked to that of Mountain Chief, an alleged hostile. When pressed with the truth, Sheridan and Sherman shifted blame from the War Department to the Office of Indian Affairs. In turn, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Ely Parker distorted information about Indian issues in Montana in his communications with Sherman, who then turned on Alfred Sully and the Office of Indian Affairs.

The military command falsified Indian-white relationships in Montana. Published in 1885, Michael Leeson’s A History of Montana, 1739–1885 summarized the prevailing attitude: “In this manner the war against the Piegans was closed, and the first great lesson in good manners taught the savages of this territory.”

In 1913, two of Heavy Runner’s sons and a daughter sought reimbursement from the federal government for the losses they suffered. Spear Woman (Emma Miller) was six years old at the time of the attack, Last Gun (Dick Kipp) seven, and Comes With Rattles (William Upham) just five. “We believe that we have a valid and just claim against the government because of the killing of our father, Chief Heavy Runner, without just cause or provocation, and for the destruction and taking of our property,” they wrote to the commissioner of Indian affairs in 1914. They asked for seventy-five thousand dollars compensation because of “a great wrong committed by Federal troops against us and our people.” Other survivors signed affidavits supportive of the Heavy Runner heirs’ compensation claims.

In 1915, Oregon senator Harry Lane, a Democrat, introduced a bill “to reimburse the heirs of Chief
Heavy Runner on account of his death and for property taken from him at the time of the Baker massacre. Senator Lane proposed the legislation three times between 1915 and 1917, and Montana senator Thomas James Walsh (also a Democrat) introduced similar bills in 1920 and 1921. And yet, the Heavy Runner heirs’ claim was considered by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs to no avail. The Piikuni heirs were burdened by the fact they were Indians—as if by being Indians their words carried less validity and their personal memories were not as reliable as published military reports. Government officials did not refer to Bear Head’s, Buffalo Trail Woman’s, Mary Middle Calf’s, or Good Bear Woman’s testimony during their inquiry. They raised no questions about Baker’s belated, incomplete, and highly questionable report on the numbers of Blackfeet people killed, wounded, and taken prisoner. Major discrepancies between what Baker reported and what the survivors remembered were simply dismissed by officials presiding over the investigation. In short, the heirs’ claim for compensation were rejected because their memories of the massacre could not be reconciled with written records created and amended in 1870. Although Congress did not conduct a thorough investigation of the atrocity, the testimony and supporting documents became part of the Records of the Senate (RG 46) and the Records of the Office of Indian Affairs (RG 75), today held in the National Archives.

The claims hearings marked the beginning of written documentation of survivors’ experiences. Spear Woman described her memories to her children, keeping alive several poignant aspects of the Piegan experience. After her death, one of her daughters, Katie Upham Croff, shared many of her vivid recollections with Rex Healy of the Winnett Times in 1932. Author James Willard Schultz recorded the narrative of Bear Head. These personal histories confirmed Blackfeet agent William B. Pease’s 1870 reports and reinforced the validity of the accounts presented by Heavy Runner’s heirs. They also broadened and deepened Piegan counternarratives.

Spear Woman recalled that early in the pre-dawn morning, the hunters left the camp, and she remembered being awakened by barking dogs. Someone called out to Heavy Runner that some soldiers were coming nearby. As Heavy Runner moved toward the troops, holding his “name paper” high above his head and greeting them, shots rang out. The soldiers fired from the bluffs at every Indian in sight. Terrorized, they rushed here and there seeking refuge. In great fear, six-year-old Spear Woman scampered into a nearby lodge filled with other frightened people and hid behind a bed backrest. After a while, the soldiers charged into the camp, moving from lodge to lodge, killing as they went. One soldier sliced a gaping hole in the bison-skin lodge covering where Spear Woman and the others hid. He poked his head and upper body through the opening. Every time someone in the lodge moved, he shot them.

Spear Woman’s oral history is confirmed by historical records. Henry Hankins, bugler for Company H, bragged that cavalrymen sliced a lodge covering, entered the tipi, and “laid low the braves within.” Hankins put a heroic twist to the events, but another soldier, William Birth, said they killed unarmed Indians. Company K mounted infantrymen cut open the lodge coverings with butcher knives and shot the frightened Indians. “We killed some with axes,” he testified a week after the incident, and “gave them an awful massacreing.”

Last Gun (Dick Kipp) continued, unsuccessfully, to seek justice. In December 1916, he revisited the Big Bend on the Marias River where the cavalry attacked and where he, at seven, had witnessed the slaying of his family. He found the remains of two pistols and posted a sign for all to see that this location was indeed the site of the massacre that had taken the lives of his family members. In 1925, Last Gun again sought assistance in obtaining recompense for the wrongful death of his father. He wrote to Governor J. E. Erickson: “We all Indian have good rembers and I still rember when how my father was kill in Baker Massacr.” Erickson promptly responded with a typed, unsigned letter saying he would be pleased to help “in your case against the government” and added, “I feel very kindly towards you and all the Indians. I have many friends among them.”

The narrative presented by Heavy Runner’s nephew, Bear Head (Kai Otokan), is also corroborated by the written record. In 1915, at age fifty-nine, Bear Head signed a three-page affidavit, which was disregarded during the claims hearings. Believing the truth needed to be brought to light, in 1935 Bear Head reiterated his story in full to his friend, author
Remembering the Baker Massacre of 1870

For centuries, Native Americans have remembered and recorded their histories in songs, storytelling, symbolic imagery, memory sticks, bison robe art, winter counts, calendar sticks, place names, and by many other means. Bear Head’s robe depicting scenes from the Baker Massacre (p. 70) and this painting by Blackfeet artist George Bull Child demonstrate that Native peoples are not “people without history” but have a variety of means for recording the events of their past and documenting their individual and collective experiences.76

In the 1930s, Bull Child transformed the memories of survivors Bear Head, Comes-with-Rattles, Heard-by-Both-Sides Woman, and Good Bear Woman (Mrs. No Chief) into visual history by painting their experiences on a tanned deer hide in the mode of a traditional war robe. Six soldiers on horseback represent the four cavalry and two infantry companies under Major Baker’s command. Dressed in black, they shoot into the camp. Eleven tipis, “painted with recognizable Blackfoot designs,” stand for Heavy Runner’s camp. The painted robe shows Heavy Runner’s body at the entrance to the camp, where its chief and protector was killed as he approached the soldiers in peace. The artist drew three pipes on the ground and showed no weapons, demonstrating that the camp was peaceful. He portrayed nine women, one girl, boys, old men, and two babies because Heavy Runner presided over a camp of women, children, and old men. The figures with bowed legs are old men, while only one man of warrior age is shown. One of the nine women is shown dead on her buffalo robe to indicate that many victims were killed while sleeping in their beds or hiding under robes and blankets. Another woman, killed well outside the boundary of the camp, illustrates the recollections of Piikunis who witnessed friends and relatives who escaped the camp but were chased down and killed. Bull Child also incorporated elders’ testimony that infants and children were killed by including images of girls, boys, and two helpless infants in the moss bags that were traditional Piikuni diapers. The painting captures survivors’ experiences and in doing so demonstrates that the attack was not a battle but an outright massacre in which “everyone inside the camp was dead.”77
James Willard Schultz. Once again, he emphasized that the “head chief of our camp of Piikunis was Bear Chief, better known as Heavy Runner.”

Bear Head witnessed soldiers gunning down his uncle in the opening volley of firing; the cavalry shot the bindings of the lodge poles, collapsed the tipis onto the fire, and burned and smothered Bear Head’s mother, Fair Singing Woman, his father’s three other wives, and their four daughters. They killed Whole (Old) Woman, the mother of his cousins, Last Gun and Lone Charge. Bear Head felt powerless to save his family, and his agony was so intense that he wished the soldiers had killed him too.

Reflecting on the massacre to Schultz, Bear Head also noted “how fast we old ones are dying off.” In 1935, Bear Head could think of just four survivors—two men and two women—still alive sixty-five years after soldiers massacred “a great camp of our tribe.” His cousin, Comes-with-Rattles (William Upham), was about age seventy-one. The two women were Heard-by-Both-Sides Woman and Good Bear Woman (Mrs. No Chief), ninety-three years old, who, like Bear Head, had signed a deposition on behalf of Heavy Runner’s children. Bear Head wanted his story written down “for the whites to read,” so they could “learn what their fathers did to us.”

In telling their story, Heavy Runner’s heirs and other survivors engaged in the “politics of memory” and set in motion counter-memories as they brought to light the Piikuni narrative and transformed the standard story into an inclusive one. These narratives are essential for understanding the historical trauma that massacres generated. Just like the Cheyennes who survived Sand Creek or the Washita, Apaches at Camp Grant, and Lakotas at Wounded Knee, Piikunis were haunted by painful memories for the remainder of their lives, and entire tribes lived in fear of a repeat offensive against their people.

As historian Ian Record wrote, to conjure up the violence and death “sears the consciousness” of the people. For some survivors, the memories were simply “too agonizing to confront.” Many avoided visiting a massacre site and refused to speak of the events—not an unusual response to extreme trauma. One Piikuni woman feared that talking about what happened—even decades later—would lead to reprisals. Fear of reprisal meant that “for years, this part of Blackfeet history remained unwritten.”

The violence inflicted on their ancestors in 1870 remains in the Piikuni social and cultural consciousness. Many families on the reservation are direct descendants of the survivors from Heavy Runner’s
band, including the Kipps, Burns, Uphams, Croffs, Fitzpatricks, and Heavy Runners. Other families trace their roots to the Cobells, Connellys, and descendants of Mountain Chief’s band. Frequently, Blackfeet tribal members gather at the massacre site on the Bear (Marias) River on January 23, where they sing, pray, and participate in commemoration ceremonies on behalf of the victims and survivors of the massacre. Part of the process of coping with the historical trauma is telling the stories of what happened and reframing the event from the perspective of the people who were killed.

Tribes have names for such events and the sites where they took place. The Cheyennes and Arapahos have the Sand Creek Massacre National Historic Site to commemorate the place where their relatives were killed and to draw attention to its significance in tribal and American history. The Lakota name for the Wounded Knee Massacre site is Wichakasotapi, “Where All Were Wiped Out” in acknowledgement of the genocide that took place there. Lakota descendants inscribed their monument as the Chief Big Foot Massacre in objection to soldiers’ conduct and American expansionism that lead to that tragedy. In Montana, Piikuni descendants of Heavy Runner’s band know the site on Big Bend on the Marias River where their families and friends perished as Itomot’ahpi Pikun’i: “Killed Off the Piegons.”

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Quilteneock had been active in voicing opposition to white encroachment since Stevens’s treaty council. See Ruby and Brown, *Indians of the Pacific Northwest*, 161.


30. Owen to Nesmith, July 11, 1858.

31. Ibid.


33. Fort Vancouver, long the major emporium of the Columbia, became a U.S. Army base after the 1846 boundary settlement.


36. Ibid.


38. Frush, *A Trip from the Dalles*, 340; Owen to Nesmith, July 16, 1858. Whether or not Kalispels were, in fact, present cannot be confirmed elsewhere; they are generally believed not to have participated in the war.

39. Owen to Nesmith, July 16, 1858.

40. Ibid. As late as September 18, when Owen sent a second letter to Nesmith, he still had not heard from George Montour, and no further mention of him is made in Owen’s letters or journals. However, Owen praised Montour’s services as both guide and interpreter and recommended Nesmith increase his salary because of the dangerous nature of Montour’s occupation. Montour married Archelette Matt, a woman of French and Salish heritage, lived in Montana, and died in 1887 in the Blackfoot River Valley. Monture Creek west of Ovando, Montana, is named for him. See Douglas Waldron, comp., *George Montour, Heroes on Broken Horses: Journals of Charles Frush, John Owens and Other Writings 1856–1858* (n.p., 2016).

41. Frush, *A Trip from the Dalles*, 340. Louis Maillot, who saw Owen upon his return to Fort Owen, attributed their release to Antoine Plante. Maillot recounted his version of this journey with Michael Ogden as far as Fort Colvile on the outbound trip. He returned safely to the Hell Gate Ronde before the troubles escalated. Maillot reported that Owen, along with a Dr. Perkins of New York and Charles Frush, traveled from The Dalles to Fort Owen in July. See Louis Maillot, “Historical Sketch of Louis R. Maillot,” in *Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana*, vol. 4 (Helena, MT, 1903): 197–228.


43. Owen to Nesmith, July 16, 1858.

44. Owen to Nesmith, Sept. 18, 1858.


46. Owen to Nesmith, Sept. 18, 1858.


48. Ibid., 342.


50. Owen to Nesmith, Sept. 18, 1858.

### The Piikuni and the U.S. Army’s Piegan Expedition

1. The Blackfoot Confederacy includes the Siksika (Blackfoot) First Nation and the Kainai (Blood) First Nation, presently residing in Alberta, Canada; the Northern Piegan/Piikuni, also of Alberta, Canada; and the southern Piegan (Blackfeet), or Piikuni, of Montana. The latter are the subject of this article, which uses “Piikuni” to identify Blackfeet, Piegans, Peigans, Piikunis, Piikani, and variations except in quoted material. The U.S. military frequently used the term “Piegans” in reference to Montana’s Blackfeet tribe. See Donald G. Frantz and Norma Jean Russell, *Blackfoot Dictionary of Stems, Roots, and Affixes*, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1995), 189.

2. Although Baker is often referred to as “Colonel” during these events, he was conferred the rank of major on April 8, 1869, and named commander of the U.S. Second Cavalry, United States Adjutant General’s Office, *Official Army Register for January 1877* (Washington, DC, 1877), 228. He reported for duty at Fort Shaw, December 22, 1869.


5. “Governor Sidney Edgerton’s First Message to the Legislative Assembly, 1865,” in *Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana*, vol. 3 (Helena, MT, 1900), 344; *Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States, 1869–1870*, vol. 69 (Washington, DC, 1870), 673.


10. Sully to Parker, Aug. 18, 1869; Trobriand to O. D. Greene, Sept. 9, 1869, fldr 1, SC 5, Régis de Trobriand Papers, 1869–1870, MHS (hereafter Trobriand Papers).

11. Sully to Parker, Aug. 18, 1869.

12. Sully to Parker, Sept. 27, 1869, Piegan Expedition Papers. Months later, Trobriand disputed Sully’s assumption that the killers were Piegan, stating that Quail was not butchered by Indians but robbed and murdered by white men who claimed Indians were responsible. Trobriand to Greene, Nov. 22, 1869, fldr 1, Trobriand Papers.


16. General Sherman told General W. B. Hazen to send word to all Comanches, Kiowas, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes “that wish to escape the effects of the present Indian war” that they “should now remove to the Reservation assigned to them.” Sheridan intended to “prosecute the war with vindictive earnestness against all Hostile Indians till they are obliterated or beg for mercy.” Sherman to W. B. Hazen, Sept. 16, 1868, vol. 89, Sherman Papers. Sherman wanted to force these tribes onto their reservations as designated by the 1867 Medicine Lodge Treaty. He remarked, “All who cling to the old hunting grounds are hostile and will remain so till killed off.” William T. Sherman to John Sherman, Sept. 23, 1868, in The Sherman Letters: Correspondence between General Sherman and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891, ed. Rachel Sherman Thorndike (New York, 1969), 287.

17. Sheridan, Record of Engagements, 14. At dawn on November 27, 1868, General George A. Custer attacked Black Kettle’s Cheyenne camp on the Washita, killed 107 people, destroyed the women, and captured fifty-three young women and children. Ibid.; De Benneville Randolph Keim, Sheridan’s Troopers on the Borders: A Winter Campaign on the Plains (New York, 1870), 24–25, 102–3, 107, 112, 114. In a similar attack on December 25, 1868, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel A. W. Evans, while scouting on the headwaters of the Red River, followed “a trail of hostile Comanches,” killed twenty-five, wounded many others, burned their village, and “destroyed a large amount of their property.” Sheridan, Record of Engagements, 17. Arapahoes and Cheyennes surrendered, as did Kiowas and Comanches, after these winter campaign engagements.


19. Sheridan to Hancock, Nov. 15, 1869, bx 94, Sheridan Papers; Hardie to Hartsuff, Jan. 13, 1870, in Piegan Indians, 47; Sheridan to Hardie, Jan. 15, 1870, ibid.; 47; Hardie to Hartsuff, Jan. 17, 1870, ibid.; 49; Green to Trobriand, Nov. 23, 1869, Piegan Expedition Papers.

20. Trobriand to Sully, Dec. 12, 1869, fldr 1, Trobriand Papers; Trobriand to Baker, Jan. 16, 1870, fldr 2, ibid.; Trobriand to Greene, Dec. 21, 1869, fldr 1, ibid.


22. The attack on Piegans mirrored the 1871 attack on peaceful Apaches at Camp Grant, Arizona. See Ian W. Record, Big Sycamore Stands Alone: The Western Apaches, Aravatia, and the Struggle for Place (Norman, OK, 2008), 188, 197.

23. Referring to winter campaigns euphemistically as a “scout” or a “surprise” was a fairly common military practice. On scouts against the Apaches, see Record, Big Sycamore Stands Alone, 118–23, 149–54, 181–84.


27. Good Bear Woman (Mrs. No Chief), affidavit, Jan. 16, 1916, Heavy Runner Records; Mary Middle Calf (Kills on the Edge; Mrs. Frank Monroe), affidavit, Jan. 18, 1915, ibid.; Buffalo Trail Woman (Mrs. Blackfoot Child), affidavit, Jan. 16, 1915, ibid.; Bear Head, affidavit, Jan. 18, 1915, ibid. The three women were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-eight at the time of the massacre. Bear Head was fourteen.

28. Good Bear Woman, affidavit; Buffalo Trail Woman, affidavit; Mary Middle Calf, affidavit. Testimony by Spear Woman, Joe Kipp, Bear Head, and Black Bear Woman supplement these observations.


30. Schultz, “The Baker Massacre,” 302. Sheridan had predicted that with the young men and warriors out hunting, the only men in the winter camps would be “decrepit” old men.

31. Ibid.; Joe Kipp, “To Whom It May Concern,” Feb. 8, 1913, Heavy Runner Records; William Birth to Perry Hobbs, Jan. 31, 1870, Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Library, Yale University, New Haven, CT.

32. Horace Clarke, affidavit, Nov. 9, 1920, Heavy Runner Records; Horace Clarke, interview by David Hilger, Sept. 27, 1924, Clarke Papers; Hamilton,

33. Spear Woman, in Rex Healy, “Baker’s Massacre on the Marias River,” Winnett Times, Mar. 31, 1932; Schultz, “The Baker Massacre,” 301; Buffalo Trail Woman, affidavit; Mary Middle Calf, affidavit; Bear Head, affidavit; Good Bear Woman, affidavit.


35. Bear Head, affidavit; Thomas Marquis, Custer, Cavalry and Crows . . . : The Story of William White as Told to Thomas Marquis (Fort Collins, CO, 1975), 33.


43. Baker to McGinniss, Feb. 18, 1870, Piegan Expedition Papers; Sully to Pease, Jan. 29, 1870, reel 3, Montana Superintendency Records; Pease to Sully, Jan. 29, 1870, reel 3, ibid.; Pease to Sully, Jan. 31, 1870, reel 1, ibid.; Sully to Troubriand, Feb. 1, 1870, Piegan Expedition Papers; Pease to Sully, Feb. 2, 1870, reel 1, Montana Superintendency Records; Pease to Sully, Feb. 6, 1870.

44. Sully to Parker, Feb. 10, 1870.


46. Pease to Sully, Apr. 7, 1870, reel 1 (1870), MF 358, U.S. Office of Indian Affairs, Montana Superintendency, 1870–1873, MHS.


48. Pease to Sully, Apr. 7, 1870; Pease to Sully, Feb. 6, 1870, S. Ex. Doc. 39, 90–91; Pease to Sully, Sept. 12, 1870, fldr 4, bx 15, RS 266, Secretary of the Interior Annual Reports, 1866–1871, MHS.

49. Troubriand to Greene, Sept. 9, 1869, Troubriand Papers; Troubriand to A.J. Simmons et al., Oct. 6, 1869, ibid.; Troubriand to Greene, Nov. 26, 1869, ibid.

50. Sheridan altered Baker’s report when he wrote that Baker “completely surprised the camps of Bear Chief and Big Horn” and added that Mountain Chief’s “lodges were found deserted and were burned by the troops.” In fact, Baker had not claimed that the abandoned seven-lodge camp was Mountain Chief’s per se, allowing Sherman to believe that Baker had killed 120 warriors in Mountain Chief’s camp. Sheridan, Record of Engagement, 26.

51. Joe Kipp, “To Whom It May Concern.”

52. Sherman to Sheridan, Mar. 12, 1870, Piegan Expedition Papers; Baker to Sheridan, Mar. 23, 1870, Heavy Runner Records; Baker to Sheridan, Mar. 23, 1870, Army and Navy Journal 7 (Apr. 2, 1870), 512. For undercounts or overestimates in massacres, see Chip Colwell-Chanthaphonh, Massacre at Camp Grant (Tucson, AZ, 2007), 90–93.


55. Hardie to Troubriand, Mar. 16, 1870, ibid.

56. Troubriand to Hardie, Mar. 17, 1870, fldr 2, Troubriand Papers; Troubriand to Hardie, Mar. 20, 1870, ibid. In contrast, Pease reported 178 noncombatants killed (ninety women, fifty children, eighteen men), with only fifteen men of warrior age. Pease to Sully, Feb. 6, 1870.


58. Clarke, affidavit; Plassman, Horace Clarke interview notes.

59. The 1868 surprise attack on Black Kettle’s village was planned by Sheridan, executed by Custer, and afterward named by the military command “the battle of the Washita.” George W. Manypenny, Our Indian Wars (Cincinnati, OH, 1880), 217–42. After the “battle,” Sheridan concluded on November 29, 1868: “If we can get one or two more good blows there will be no more Indian troubles in my department. Ibid., 219. Similar patterns of referring to one-sided attacks as “battles” emerged after the annihilation of Cheyennes at Sand Creek in 1864. Kelman, A Misplaced Massacre, 8. Although Sand Creek was investigated as a massacre, the dominant narrative continued to present it as a battle. Lindsay Regan Calhoun, Public Memory of the Sand Creek Massacre (Anchorage, NY, 2012), 38–41.

60. Sherman to Sully, Apr. 4, 1870, Piegan Expedition Papers.


62. Manypenny, Our Indian Wars, 215; Sherman to Sheridan, Nov. 4, 1869, Piegan Expedition Papers. In a sprinkling of Sherman’s spontaneous comments about Indians, he advocated for their total abolition and “extermination.”


64. Sherman to Sheridan, Mar. 24, 1870, Piegan Expedition Papers; Sheridan to Sherman, Feb. 28, 1870, bx 91, Sheridan Papers; Sheridan to Sherman, Mar. 18, 1870, in Piegan Indians, 70–71.


68. Colwell-Chataphonphon, Massacre at Camp Grant, 11–12; Grua, Surviving Wounded Knee, 173.


70. Lane to Ashurst, Jan. 24, 1916; Grua, Surviving Wounded Knee, 6–7, 134–35. In his 1913 “To Whom It May Concern” letter, Joe Kipp claimed he counted 217 Indians killed, most of them old men, women, and children. Baker reported 120 of those killed were warriors or “able men.” The heirs and Kipp stated that Baker killed mostly noncombatants. P. A. Jones to Sen. Henry F. Ashurst, Feb. 20, 1915, Heavy Runner Records.


73. On testing oral history narratives for validity, reliability, and consistency, see Colwell-Chanaphonphon, Massacre at Camp Grant, 12.


81. For Camp Grant Massacre oral narratives, see Record, Big Sycamore Stands Alone, xi–xii, 10–13, 296n.17. For another view of oral traditions, see Vine Deloria Jr., Red Earth, White Lies: Native Americans and the Myth of Scientific Fact (Golden, CO, 1997), 23–45.

82. Record, Big Sycamore Stands Alone, 282.

83. Silence as a response to extreme trauma is not unique. Camp Grant Massacre survivors kept silent, not “saying a word … about it” for much of the rest of their lives. Record, Big Sycamore Stands Alone, 129.


“Enriched by the Vitalized Pictures”


3. Ibid., 4.